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Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. Non-racist versions of BRR have emerged recently based on sophisticated and reputable work in science and philosophy (Hardimon 2003; 2017; Spencer 2012; 2014; 2019a). In this chapter, I examine Quayshawn Spencer?€?s new version of BRR and argue that it fails to consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. To do so, I rely on the ?€?science and values?€? literature and the notions of inductive, epistemic, and ethical risk (Douglas 2000; Douglas 2009; Brown 2015; Biddle and Kukla 2017; Elliot and Richards 2017). Once one realizes the complex relationship between these types of risks and BRR, Spencer?€?s sophisticated metaphysical arguments become less appealing than one might think. Furthermore, broad questions arise concerning how socially responsible metaphysics should be done.